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Platforms: The First Amendment Misfits
JANE BAMBAUER*, JAMES ROLLINS**, AND VINCENT YESUE***
This Essay explains why previous First Amendment precedents that allowed
government to require a private entity to host the speech of others have limited
applicability to online platforms like Twitter and Facebook. Moreover, the backdrop
of an open internet makes platforms sufficiently vulnerable to competition and
responsive to “listener” preferences that the dominance of some firms like Facebook
and Google is not really a chokepoint: aggressive changes to content curation will
lead to user dissatisfaction and defection, whether those changes are made by the
government or the companies themselves. As a result, there are no close analogies
in First Amendment precedent for internet platforms.
We identify the similarities between social media platforms and more traditional
venues for speech (like mail, malls, and television) but ultimately conclude there are
critical differences that break the analogies. We then compare the role of social
media platforms to basic internet service providers to better understand how the line
between speech participants and mere conduits should be drawn in an online context.
We find that First Amendment caselaw and the reasoning that flows through it would
categorize platforms like Twitter and Facebook as speech participants. Next, we
consider whether public perception of platforms standing in the role of a “public
square” should significantly alter the First Amendment protections afforded to
platforms, arguing that it should not. Finally, we argue that online platforms are
their own free speech creature that deserve strong protection from government
intervention in hosting and curation choices. However, they may be good targets for
transparency requirements.
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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to legal protections, online platforms are the darlings of a free
speech world. Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, they are
completely protected from legal responsibility for publishing defamatory, harassing,
or other illegal content, even where the authors or traditional newspaper publishers
would not be. In this sense, they are treated like mere conduits who have no legal or
moral responsibility for the content that they distribute.
And yet, unlike other conduits (such as telephone service or even broadband
internet service), platforms are free to pick and choose between which authors and
messages to host. Indeed, the dominant conception of Section 230 actually
encourages platforms to do this sort of purging in order to help internet users avoid
the toxic effects of illegal or lawful-but-awful content. Thus, under current law,
platforms enjoy all the curatorial powers of traditional publisher and all the legal
immunities of mere conduits. It’s the best of both worlds, as far as the law goes.
Of course, public perception is another matter. Some Americans are upset that
online platforms haven’t done enough content moderation while others believe they
are doing too much, and in a biased manner. Both of these perspectives have found
their way to court.1 And all were dismissed. But the states of Texas and Florida have
passed laws constraining content moderation to some degree and are inching closer
to a “must-carry” rule for online platforms. This Essay explains why previous First
Amendment precedents that allowed government to require a private entity to host
the speech of others have limited applicability to online platforms like Twitter and
Facebook. Moreover, the backdrop of an open internet makes platforms sufficiently
vulnerable to competition and responsive to “listener” preferences that the
dominance of some firms like Facebook and Google is not really a chokepoint:
aggressive changes to content curation will lead to user dissatisfaction and defection,
whether those changes are made by the government or the companies themselves. As
a result, there are no close analogies in First Amendment precedent for internet
platforms.

1. Constituents for Thoughtful Governance v. Twitter, Inc., No. CGC-20-583244 (Cal.
Super. Ct. July, 13 2020) (not enough content removal); Rutenberg v. Twitter, Inc., No. 4:21cv-00548-YGR (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2021) (too much content removal); Newman v. Google
LLC, No. 20-CV-04011-LHK, 2021 WL 2633423 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2021) (content removal
performed in a racially biased manner).
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This Essay finds practical and doctrinal limits to analogizing content moderation
practices to other contexts with more established First Amendment precedent. We
identify the similarities between social media platforms and more traditional venues
for speech (like mail, malls, and television) in Part I but explain their critical
differences in Part II. In Part III, we compare the role of social media platforms to
basic internet service providers (ISPs) to better understand how the line between
speech participants and mere conduits should be drawn in an online context. We find
that First Amendment caselaw and the reasoning that flows through it would
categorize platforms like Twitter and Facebook as speech participants. In Part IV, we
consider whether public perception of platforms standing in the role of a “public
square” should significantly alter the First Amendment protections afforded to
platforms, arguing that it should not (for similar reasons as the critical differences
we noted in Part II—namely, that online forums cannot dominate and lock in
participants.) In Part V, we argue that online platforms are their own free speech
creature that deserve strong protection from government intervention in hosting and
curation choices, but also that platforms may be good targets for transparency
requirements.
I. (SUPERFICIAL) SIMILARITIES BETWEEN PLATFORMS AND THE DOMINANT
INFORMATION CURATORS OF THE PAST
The federal government has a long history of regulating curators of
information. Before the enactment of Section 230,2 the government often used free
speech theory as a reason to intervene in the activities of dominant information
curators, including the U.S. Post Office, newspapers, broadcast and cable television
providers, and private property owners. This Part explores the government’s
justifications for significantly regulating these curators, and it highlights the features
they share with major internet platforms today. However, as we will explain in later
Parts, these similarities are more superficial than they first appear.
We begin with the first user-generated social media: mail. The U.S. Postal
Service (USPS) was “premised on the notion that a communications network was
central to an educated populace.”3 Publishers’ access to exclusive below-cost mailing
rates, first established by the 1792 Post Office Act,4 became a flashpoint for First
Amendment rights. In 1921, in the Burleson case, the Supreme Court upheld the
exclusion of a socialist daily paper from low-cost second-class mailing prices on the
grounds that the publication’s anti-war statements constituted non-mailable matter
under the Espionage Act.5 The publisher argued that the exclusion infringed the
company’s right to free speech.6 Asserting that the publisher’s access to the second-

2. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
3. Anuj C. Desai, The Transformation of Statutes into Constitutional Law: How Early
Post Office Policy Shaped Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 671, 687
(2007).
4. Id. at 692–93 (discussing the Congressional debates over reduced newspaper mailing
rates and the “selective” vs. “general” admission of newspapers into the program).
5. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S.
407, 408 (1921).
6. Id. at 409, 411.
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class rates was a “privilege,” the majority held that the Postmaster General could
exclude the publisher indefinitely.7
But Justice Holmes, whose quotable dissenting opinions in this period would later
transform American free speech law, found merit in the publisher’s First Amendment
argument. He noted that refusing second-class rate access to a newspaper made it
cost prohibitive for that publication to distribute information as widely as other
newspapers.8 The dissent argued that the Postmaster General had conflated the
Espionage Act, which punished publications for promoting unlawful content, with
the Mail Classification Act, which set forth the requirements of a “newspaper”
entitled to the second-class rate.9 “The United States may give up the Post Office
when it sees fit,” said Holmes, “but while it carries it on[,] the use of the mails is
almost as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues.”10
The Court later adopted this reasoning in two cases expanding public access to
information. In Hannegan v. Esquire, the Court held that the Postmaster General was
without power to set standards for which mailable periodicals meet the standards of
public good or welfare.11 In Blount v. Rizzi, it held that a statute prohibiting the
mailing of letters containing materials deemed by the Postmaster General as
“obscene” violated appellees’ First Amendment rights to free speech and
expression.12 There, the Court emphasized that judicial participation in any
censorship was required, and the burden was on the government to initiate that
procedure.13
The analogy to modern platforms is irresistible. Media censorship by modern
platforms shares many features with the Burleson-era censorship by the post office.
Without access to online publication, publishers have little hope of reaching a sizable
audience.14 Online platforms have administrative procedures for removing users’
posts based on their rules and terms of service.15 Many include clauses prohibiting
loosely-defined offensive or inappropriate content; this is arguably similar to the
Postmaster General deeming which publications served the “public good.”16 And

7. Id. at 416.
8. Id. at 437–38 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
9. See id. at 425–27, 437 (first Brandeis, J., dissenting; then Holmes, J., dissenting).
10. Id. at 437 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
11. 327 U.S. 146, 156–57 (1946).
12. 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971).
13. Id. at 417–18.
14. See Elisa Shearer, Social Media Outpaces Print Newspapers in the U.S. as a News
Source, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/12/10/social-media-outpaces-print-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/
[https://perma.cc/KZ87-K4W4].
15. See, e.g., App Store Review Guidelines, APPLE, https://developer.apple.com/appstore/review/guidelines/#legal [https://perma.cc/TVC2-MKF5] (June 7, 2021) (companies
that host applications for smartphones); The Twitter Rules, TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules [https://perma.cc/9ZUU-5ML6]
(social
media
companies);
AWS
Acceptable
Use
Policy,
AMAZON,
https://aws.amazon.com/aup/ [https://perma.cc/B9G5-LF57] (July 1, 2021) (cloud hosting
services).
16. See Recognize and Report Spam, Inappropriate, and Abusive Content, LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/37822 [https://perma.cc/CKV8-4GGE] (July
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while users can appeal a deleted post or suspended account, repeated offenses can
lead to a permanent ban.17 Moreover, currently there are no remedies afforded in
these companies’ terms of use agreements or recognized by courts despite numerous
attempts by suspended users to get courts and legislatures to create one.18
The Court has also approved of federal intervention through antitrust law to
prevent coordinated censorship across newspapers. When the Associated Press (AP)
allowed in its by-laws the exclusion of news delivery to non-members and the
blockage of new members by competitors, the Court upheld the district court’s partial
grant of summary judgment enjoining the AP from enforcing them.19 The AP argued
that applying the Sherman Act to the association violated the association’s First
Amendment rights.20 The Court rejected this argument, stating that the government
had the power to protect publishers’ freedom to publish from private interests
because of the overriding principle that the public welfare is best served by the free
flow of information from opposing viewpoints.21 “Freedom of the press from
governmental interference,” said the Court, “does not sanction repression of that
freedom by private interests.”22 The issues in Associated Press have modern
relevance in light of the debates about the dominant market position of the social
media firms that were responsible for the “Great Deplatforming”—that is, the
decision to suspend Donald Trump’s social media accounts.23
The government has also regulated content moderation by broadcast companies.
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Supreme Court upheld regulations

2021); About Offensive Content, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-andsecurity/offensive-tweets-and-content [https://perma.cc/7XGK-5ZGK].
17. Account/Content
Restricted
or
Removed,
LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/82934 [https://perma.cc/3ALD-NPUY] (July
2021); Our Approach to Policy Development and Enforcement Philosophy, TWITTER,
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/enforcement-philosophy
[https://perma.cc/A7HL-22J5].
18. See Eric Goldman, Comments on Trump’s Lawsuits Against YouTube, Facebook, and
Twitter, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (July 12, 2021), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2021/07/comments-on-trumps-lawsuits-against-youtube-facebook-and-twitter.htm
[https://perma.cc/3RXV-43YN] (Trump cases against Twitter, Facebook, YouTube); Mitchell
Ferman, Twitter’s Lawsuit Against Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton Tossed by Federal
Judge, TEX. TRIB. (May 11, 2021 8:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/05/11/twittertexas-ken-paxton/ [https://perma.cc/38S3-YB9B] (courts striking down Florida law).
19. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 23 (1945); see also United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (describing the grant of summary
judgment).
20. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 19–20.
21. See id. at 18–20.
22. Id. at 20.
23. See, e.g., Erin Carroll, Anupam Chander, David Vladeck, & Hillary Brill, Technology
and Democracy After the “Great Deplatforming”, GEO. L. SCH. (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://www.facebook.com/events/240336104333480/?active_tab=discussion
[https://perma.cc/ZP2N-3MSL]; Jane Bambauer, Genevieve Lakier & Adam White, The First
Amendment, Section 230, and Content Moderation, ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH. (March 3, 2021),
https://masonlec.org/events/the-first-amendment-section-230-and-content-moderation/
[https://perma.cc/2GZQ-XLFP].
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requiring broadcasters to give individuals and political candidates opportunities to
respond to attacks and editorials carried on their broadcasts.24 In so doing, the Court
found that the Federal Communications Act of 1934 actually enhanced the freedoms
of speech and press.25 The Court borrowed from its reasoning in Associated Press
and warned against giving station owners and networks the power to censor all views
on public issues other than their own.26 The Court based its decision on several
factors, including a perceived scarcity in broadcast capabilities and, importantly, the
government’s role in allocating that scarce spectrum through licenses. The licensing
process bolstered “the legitimate claims of those unable without governmental
assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views.”27 High
entry costs for new competitors and the advantages afforded existing broadcasters—
including confirmed habits of consumers, operational experience, and network
affiliation—furthered the rationale for imposing requirements that existing
broadcasters be fair and balanced.28
In the same vein, existing online platforms have a strategic advantage that could
invite government regulation. A tech startup looking for a cloud computing vendor
that provides networking, storage, and servers has relatively few options: the five
largest cloud computing vendors own over 80% of the market share in this sector.29
For social media companies, the concentration is even more pronounced: the five
largest platforms own more than 98% of the market share, with Facebook alone
accounting for nearly 70%.30 While the scarcity in this context may not be a function
of physical limitations, network “lock-in” effects may still create barriers to entry.31
Although the practical importance of network effects in social networking markets
is still a matter of live debate,32 a small group of companies host most of the

24. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
25. Id. at 375.
26. See id. at 392.
27. Id. at 400.
28. See id.
29. Cloud Computing Market Share, Market Size and Industry Growth Drivers, 2018LABS,
https://www.t4.ai/industry/cloud-computing-market-share#:~:text=
2024,
T4
The%20leading%20vendor%20in%20the%20IaaS%20Cloud%20Computing%20Industry%2
0was,others%20with%2019.9%25%20market%20share [https://perma.cc/4297-2GAP] (Feb.
15, 2021). As of 2019, Amazon is the largest with a 45% market share, followed by Microsoft
at 17.9% and Alibaba at 9.1%. See id. Some commentators advise startups to avoid using cloud
computing vendors. See The Three Infrastructure Mistakes Your Company Must Not Make,
FIRST ROUND REV., https://review.firstround.com/the-three-infrastructure-mistakes-yourcompany-must-not-make [https://perma.cc/3EF7-XUFQ]. However, content delivery
networks might be a real bottleneck; a new social media platform would certainly need content
delivery network services even if it can avoid cloud service providers.
30. Social Media Market Share, Market Size and Industry Growth Drivers, 2018-2023,
LABS
(Jan.
23,
2021),
https://www.t4.ai/industry/social-media-marketT4
share#:~:text=The%20leading%20platform%20in%20the,with%202%25%20social%20medi
a%20market [https://perma.cc/J24W-PMRW].
31. Tejvan Pettinger, Network Effects – Definition and Examples, ECON. HELP,
https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/network-effects/
[https://perma.cc/2UMQHE8Q].
32. James C. Cooper, Antitrust & Privacy, GLOB. ANTITRUST INST. REP. ON THE DIGIT.

366027-ILJ 97-3_Text.indd 254

5/5/22 2:59 PM

2022]

FIRST AMENDMENT MISFITS

1053

information produced and consumed by end users, and therefore wield significant
power over the information environment. And because, as described above, these
companies implement their own guidelines for removing content and banning users,
such “moderation” may amount to little more than platforms bending to the demands
of their most vocal users.33
Similar to broadcasting, governmental restrictions on cable networks have been
upheld when such restrictions are content-neutral and promote low-cost access to a
spectrum of information and opinions.34 In Turner, the Court upheld sections of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 which required
cable television networks to reserve a portion of channels to local broadcasters.35 The
Court clarified that these “must-carry” provisions did not discriminate against
particular views or ideas, but simply put two types of content providers on more
equal economic footing.36
There isn’t enough data to determine whether platforms are biased against
conservative or liberal voices.37 At the very least, conservatives overwhelmingly feel
they are the target of censorship, and a majority of Americans believe platforms
censor political viewpoints they find objectionable.38 After all, as discussed above,
these companies have a dominant market share and set their own definitions of
“offensive” or “misleading” content. However, while in cable television this
prompted government regulation in the form of must-carry provisions, for online
platforms there has been no action taken.
The right of individuals to receive a fair balance of information has been
acknowledged even where private companies wholly own the land and community
in which those individuals live. In Marsh v. Alabama, the Supreme Court affirmed

ECON. 32, at 1189 (2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3733752
[https://perma.cc/VH45-RTQ4]. One reason the impact of lock-in effects is difficult to gauge
is because the “market” for social networking is poorly defined. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube,
and TikTok have similarities, particularly in the sense of competing for users’ time and
attention, but they offer differentiated experiences, with some exceptions (e.g., Parler may
simply be Twitter for Trump supporters). LinkedIn, GitHub, Substack, etc., are even more
different. Moreover, while network effects may cause users to join or remain with one
particular platform such as Facebook, there is relatively little that prevents the same user from
joining and maintaining profiles on other platforms at the same time. This differs from the
network effects of consumer goods with non-zero prices, which form the basis for the
economic models of “network effects.”
33. Andrew Marantz, The Importance, and Incoherence, of Twitter’s Trump Ban, THE
NEW YORKER (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/theimportance-and-incoherence-of-twitters-trump-ban [https://perma.cc/RG8F-4EZ2].
34. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
35. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, 47 U.S.C. § 609 (1992).
36. Turner, 520 U.S. at 185–86, 194.
37. See James Clayton, Social Media: Is It Really Biased Against US Republicans?, BBC
(Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-54698186 [https://perma.cc/37N9RSGC].
38. Emily A. Vogels, Andrew Perrin, & Monica Anderson, Most Americans Think Social
Media Sites Censor Political Viewpoints, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 17, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/08/19/most-americans-think-social-media-sitescensor-political-viewpoints/ [https://perma.cc/Q6P8-TYKZ].
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the right of an individual to distribute religious pamphlets in the “business block” of
a company-owned town.39 The town’s management requested the woman leave the
town and, when she declined, arrested and charged her for criminal trespass.40 The
Supreme Court reversed her conviction and held that the State of Alabama could not
enforce a trespass judgment against her, because such action infringed her First and
Fourteenth Amendment freedom of press and religion.41 In so doing, the Court
reaffirmed that individuals’ First Amendment rights occupy a “preferred position”
over the rights of property owners.42 “The more [a property owner] . . . opens up his
property for use by the public,” said the Court, “the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”43 The
Court has upheld such limitations on property owners in much less extreme cases.
Short of company towns, the Court has prohibited the use of trespass laws to remove
individuals exercising their First Amendment rights on properties that serve as freely
accessible community business centers.44 And in PruneYard, the Supreme Court has
recognized states’ rights to interpret their own constitutions to require free speech
access to private spaces like shopping malls, within reason.45
Thus, in the digital landscape, lawmakers and legal scholars point to these
precedents to argue that internet platforms, too, are privately-owned public forums
that should have affirmative obligations to provide a venue for free speech.46 For
example, Facebook—which began as a local networking site for Harvard
students47—now averages 255 million monthly users in the United States and Canada
alone.48 More than half of Americans now get a substantial portion of their news
from social media.49 These companies have opened up their “property” (i.e., their
servers and infrastructure) for all sorts of public discourse and activity. It stands to

39. 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946).
40. Id. at 503.
41. Id. at 508–09.
42. Id. at 509.
43. Id. at 506.
44. See Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308,
318–19, 325 (1968).
45. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
46. Eugene Volokh, Treating Social Media Platforms like Common Carriers?, 2021 J.
FREE SPEECH L. 377 (2021); Adam Candeub, Bargaining for Free Speech: Common Carriage,
Network Neutrality, and Section 230, 22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 391 (2020).
47. Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2007, 5:29 EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia
[https://perma.cc/SJU2-SNU9].
48. Tyler Sonnemaker, Facebook Reported a Decline of 2 Million Daily Active Users in
(Oct.
29,
2020,
5:29
PM),
the
US
and
Canada,
BUS. INSIDER
https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-decline-2-million-daily-users-us-canada-q3earnings-2020-10 [https://perma.cc/G448-8AEE].
49. Elisa Shearer & Elizabeth Grieco, Americans Are Wary of the Role Social Media Sites
(Oct.
2,
2019),
Play
in
Delivering
the
News,
PEW RSCH. CTR.
https://www.journalism.org/2019/10/02/americans-are-wary-of-the-role-social-media-sitesplay-in-delivering-the-news/ [https://perma.cc/CSQ5-U6DN] (reporting that 55% of
Americans in 2019 received news from social media, up from 47% in 2018).
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reason, then, that users’ rights to free speech should take priority over platforms’
eagerness to remove undesirable information.
At first glance, the similarities between online platforms and historical carriers of
information are striking. As the next Part discusses, however, these similarities are
more superficial than they appear and do not warrant the level of federal intervention
used in the contexts of the USPS, cable television, or a company town. As the next
Part will explain, online platforms like Twitter cannot lock in listeners. This fact
knocks the bottom out from the free speech theories described so far because
platforms have little to exploit other than their users’ conditional willingness to
engage. Platforms are thus much more responsive to the demands and preferences of
users.
II. CRITICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ONLINE PLATFORMS AND THE DOMINANT
INFORMATION CURATORS OF THE PAST
The digital landscape in which platforms like Facebook and Twitter operate is
materially different from that of the last century. Free speech law is not a one-sizefits-all solution; the steps taken to rein in the issues surrounding online platforms
should likewise reflect the unique features of the online environment.
First, when comparing online platforms to historical information curators, it is
misleading to treat online platforms as a static set of durable institutions that will
dominate the market for generations. It’s true that the five largest online platforms
represent the center of gravity of the market, but it’s wrong to assume that they will
always dominate users’ attention (ask Orkut, MySpace, Friendster, and GeoCities).50
It is not at all clear yet that platforms like Facebook face less competition than
traditional media firms like The New York Times or NBC.
Moreover, online platforms offer a range of differentiated substitutes to
consumers.51 Dimensions along which these differences can be measured include
their purpose and ownership, the extent and manner in which they curate or remove
their users’ speech, the format or medium of the speech (e.g., short-form text, longform text, or video), the devices on which they are accessible (e.g., phone, personal
computers, or both), and the degree to which they are open or closed to new
subscribers (e.g., open to the public like Twitter versus closed like Clubhouse).52

50. SuccessiveTech, What Made Your Favourite Social Networking Sites Go Down?,
MEDIUM (Sept. 11, 2019), https://medium.com/successivetech/what-made-your-favouritesocial-networking-sites-go-down-5d7e92f23549 [https://perma.cc/ST7M-ADAT].
51. See FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ [https://perma.cc/35TA-K5WB];
https://www.youtube.com/
[https://perma.cc/625F-MGGZ];
TWITTER,
YOUTUBE,
https://twitter.com/ [https://perma.cc/YU8E-W3H6]; REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/
[https://perma.cc/ZHE5-67G6]; GAB, https://gab.com/ [https://perma.cc/LBD4-2392];
https://parler.com/main.php
[https://perma.cc/L9XW-966L];
FORTNITE,
PARLER,
https://www.epicgames.com/fortnite/en-US/home [https://perma.cc/69EB-BJ2G].
52. Karen Petrauskas, What Are the Differences Between the Big Social Media
Platforms?, KJP CREATIVE (Apr. 10, 2019), https://kjpcreative.com/what-are-the-differencesbetween-the-big-social-media-platforms [https://perma.cc/C2RM-BM9F]; Heather Kelly &
Nitasha Tiku, Clubhouse 101: What You Should Know About the Invite-Only, Audio Social
POST
(Feb.
10,
2021),
App,
WASH.
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Together, these dissimilarities make platforms quite different from historical
curators of information like newspapers, radio, and television. Indeed, as we explain
in this Part, some of the decisions made by online platforms that garner the greatest
amount of criticism are very likely caused by competition. Both deplatforming and
failure to remove offensive content can be understood and explained as attempts to
slavishly cater to the segment of users that the platform is trying to attract or retain.
Thus, the theory that undergirds the “must-carry” rules in existing First Amendment
precedent does not fit the current circumstances.
Let’s begin with the USPS, which is the easiest to distinguish. The USPS is part
of the federal government, which makes it both a public forum for private speech
and regulable insofar as it engages in government speech.53 Both of these matter.
From the perspective of a user of the mail like a newspaper publisher, a user’s access
to the USPS can be considered critical public infrastructure for the act of speech,
particularly in the 1920s. A decision not to carry a particular newspaper is made by
the government, providing a direct route to challenge state action that burdens
speech.
In Burleson, for example, dissenters Holmes and Brandeis argued that the federal
government was central to the distribution of information, and the core issue
involved access to mailing rates, not access to readers.54 They advocated that the
Postmaster General could not designate a publication as obscene or treasonable and
then essentially tax that publication out of existence by denying access to lower
mailing rates.55
Holmes’ and Brandeis’ critique of the USPS does not extend to private
companies—including social media companies—even if the companies’ services
include the carriage of speech. The federal government does not own the cloud
servers that host Facebook, Twitter, and other social media websites.56 Moreover,
from the perspective of the entity carrying the speech, the public mail service is also
at a disadvantage. As a state-created agency, the USPS must respect the regulations
enacted by Congress to control it in the Mail Classification Act. If that Act had
required all media publications to be carried at the less expensive rate, the USPS
would have no First Amendment challenge to vindicate its own rights to curate
information as it pleases. This puts the USPS in a different stead from private
companies that might have expressive interests in defining what is acceptable and
unacceptable content on their platforms.57

https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/02/10/what-is-clubhouse-faq/
[https://perma.cc/36P8-TC6W].
53. See 39 U.S.C. § 201.
54. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S.
407, 417 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 436 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 431 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 436–37 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
56. In fact, the converse appears to be true. For instance, AWS hosts servers for the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs, Medicare and Medicaid Services, and the National Oceanic
Atmospheric Administration, among other governmental departments. Cloud Computing for
https://aws.amazon.com/federal/
Federal
Government, AMAZON WEB SERVS.,
[https://perma.cc/G47N-4XTY].
57. Mail Classification Act, ch. 180, 20 Stat. 355 (1879).
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Neither is the antitrust approach from Associated Press palatable. There, the
deplatforming, so to speak, was a product of the association’s bylaws, which
restricted membership at the whim of a publisher’s competitors.58 The Supreme
Court deemed this to be an arrangement that stifled competition between publishers59
and found the Associated Press members’ First Amendment rights were not violated
by forcing reform of the association’s membership rules.60
Large technology companies likely do engage in some anticompetitive behavior.61
However, unlike the print media companies governed by Associated Press, the
attempts of online platforms to control the use of their services are not intended to
block other competitors from marketing their own services. In fact, the control
exercised by online platforms to shape usage through content moderation is itself a
driver of market fragmentation and competition; that is, when existing online
platforms control their uses too much, they create the demand for new online
platforms that have different philosophies about how their services should be used.
For example, when it launched in 2018, Parler advertised itself as an alternative to
Twitter and Facebook.62 When Parler was taken offline in January of 2021, it had
around 15 million users.63 After Amazon withdrew its hosting services, Epik began
hosting the site in February 2021.64 By banning accounts and purging certain content,
the largest social media platforms increased their competition in the marketplace
rather than reducing it. If the subsequent revolt of the hosting companies (including
Amazon) suggests there is a bottleneck that can be controlled by a few companies,
the entire episode shows that it is hosting services rather than social media services
that have such power. Amazon’s conduct, rather than Twitter’s, may provide the
right place for an analogy to Associated Press.
The government has the responsibility of protecting publishers’ rights to speak
freely, and thus had the responsibility to restrain the Associated Press from blocking
this right.65 Since online platforms’ content moderation tends to induce competition

58. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 4 (1945).
59. Id. at 11.
60. Id. at 20.
61. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Sues Facebook for Illegal
Monopolization (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/12/ftcsues-facebook-illegal-monopolization [https://perma.cc/45K9-VKYN] (arguing that
Facebook’s acquisition of rivals Instagram and WhatsApp, along with the conditions imposed
on its software developers, stifles competition).
62. See, e.g., Mike Isaac & Kellen Browning, Fact-Checked on Facebook and Twitter,
Conservatives Switch Their Apps, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/11/
technology/parler-rumble-newsmax.html [https://perma.cc/D54Q-DZ6N] (Nov. 18, 2020)
(listing Parler, Newsmax, MeWe, and Rumble as new upstarts benefitting from Big Tech
censorship).
63. Jeff Horwitz & Keach Hagey, Parler CEO Says He Was Fired as Platform Neared
Restoring Service, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/parler-ceo-says-he-was-firedby-conservative-political-donor-rebekah-mercer-11612397380
[https://perma.cc/5QMPXGAR] (Feb. 3, 2021, 11:13 PM).
64. Adi Robertson, Parler Is Back Online After a Month of Downtime, THE VERGE (Feb.
15, 2021, 11:48 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/15/22284036/parler-social-networkrelaunch-new-hosting [https://perma.cc/LHB9-X57Y].
65. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20.
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rather than suppress it, Associated Press provides no justification for courts stepping
in to resolve disputes between online platforms and their users who seek relief from
restraint of their speech.
The precedents related to broadcast media are the next easiest to differentiate,
because although tech companies appear superficially similar to broadcasting and
cable companies of the twentieth century, the technical limitations that called for
regulations of the latter do not exist on the internet. New entrants to broadcast media
are limited by the scarcity of available transmission bandwidth across the frequency
spectrum, and this resource is controlled by the federal government. In Red Lion, for
instance, the Court repeatedly emphasized that the government had an interest in
allocating a scarce resource like broadcasting frequencies so that Americans could
receive balanced information.66 And to the extent the Court recognized that new
entrants to the market needed help against established players, the Court also
recognized that it assisted those earlier competitors through the licensing
agreements.67 Analogously, part of the reason cable systems like those in Turner
justified limiting the carriage of free local stations was that there is only so much
data that can be squeezed into a cable and thus there is a physical limit on the number
of stations that such a system can carry.68
The nature of the internet is different; no government license is necessary to
operate a new website, and assuming market demand exists, the network is wide open
to new entrants. While the capacity of cloud computing services is finite,69 the
problem is fundamentally different than that of broadcasting and Associated Press.
While physics limits the spectrum of broadcast frequencies, computing power is a
function of engineering and investment, and over the last five years, the total amount
of cloud storage has consistently increased.70
The scarcity inherent in EMF bandwidth compared to the nearly boundless
capacity of the internet to support new, innovative services means that it’s not
necessary to put burdens on existing services to support messages that are
inconsistent with their philosophies, because there is an alternative for those with
different philosophies: they can send their message out on their own using the same
public web. It’s fair to argue, then, that the justifications for imposing must-carry
provisions on broadcast and cable television do not apply to social media companies.

66. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
67. Id. at 400.
68. Chris Williams, Cable’s Crunched Signals Irritate HD Die-Hards, ABC NEWS (Apr.
20, 2008, 5:43 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=4691553&page=1
[https://perma.cc/W29B-L8UT].
69. See, e.g., Caroline Donnelly, Coronavirus: Microsoft Azure Suffers Datacentre
Capacity Shortages in Europe, COMPUT. WKLY. (Apr. 7, 2020, 9:02 AM),
https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252481265/Coronavirus-Microsoft-Azure-suffersdatacentre-capacity-shortages-in-Europe [https://perma.cc/RK4N-839E]; Tom Coughlin, Will
COVID-19 Drive Data Center Memory Shortages?, FORBES (Mar. 21, 2020, 1:33 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomcoughlin/2020/03/21/will-covid-19-drive-data-centermemory-shortages/?sh=3c69bea97be7 [https://perma.cc/3JPD-EPWN].
70. See Data Center Storage Capacity Worldwide from 2016 to 2021, by Segment,
STATISTA (Mar. 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/638593/worldwide-data-centerstorage-capacity-cloud-vs-traditional/ [https://perma.cc/8QAU-8RDK].
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That leaves the demand and decisions of individual users themselves as the critical
constraint for online speech. Does the behavior of individual users, and the pragmatic
consequences of a large number of private decisions, make online speech platforms
like Facebook and Twitter the equivalent of a public forum?
To explore this question, we start with the cases involving private physical spaces,
such as the company town in Marsh. The justification for treating company towns as
equivalent to public fora in Marsh is that there are very few avenues for open public
discourse when a single firm owns the land in which employees live, shop, and access
public services like post offices. Because the company town offered its residents
nearly every conceivable good and service, whether purely recreational or of
practical necessity, residents had little reason to leave. Thus, the private operation of
the town of Chickasaw was “essentially a public function.”71 Since nearly all of the
needs of ordinary life were fulfilled in the company town, speakers with disfavored
content had little chance of exposing residents to their speech.
Moreover, the remedy in Marsh was different than what many seek with respect
to social media. There, the company town had used Alabama’s penal code and law
enforcement to censor the appellant. “Insofar as the State has attempted to impose
criminal punishment,” said the Marsh Court, “[that] action cannot stand.”72 The
Court in essence prevented the town from enforcing the Alabama statutes, which
were said to violate the townspeople’s First and Fourteenth Amendments. Similarly,
in Logan Valley, the Court prevented the shopping center from using state trespass
law to stop picketing on its property.
The shopping mall in PruneYard shared some similarities to the company town
of Chickasaw. The shoppers at a mall do not live and work in the mall, and therefore
have other avenues for speech to reach them. However, at the height of mallrat
culture, the mall was the place to see and be seen. The California Supreme Court
even noted that 25,000 people visited the PruneYard shopping center each day, which
is remarkable considering that the town where it was located (Campbell, California)
had only 26,000 residents at the time the PruneYard decision was handed down.73 A
local mall therefore exercised considerable power over access to the attention of town
residents. The difference between the mall and the company town is one of degree;
malls in the 1970s and 1980s dominated some of the attention and experience of its
visitors—enough to justify a state-imposed “must carry” rule—but not enough to
reach the practical equivalent of a sovereign state.
Precedents like Turner regulating the common carriage of cable companies can
be understood along the same lines as the continuum between Marsh and PruneYard:
even though cable customers could theoretically reconfigure their televisions to use
bunny-ear antennae when they want to watch broadcast television instead of cable
television, as a practical matter, they did not. That stickiness that locked users into
the cable programming persuaded the Court that cable companies could be

71. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
72. Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
73. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 78 (1980); Campbell, California,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campbell,_California [https://perma.cc/P4CL836W] (Jan. 15, 2022, 23:08) (stating 1980 census figures).
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compelled to use some of their channel capacity to run local broadcast channels.
When it came to television programming, cable services were the company town.74
Online platforms have no control over the physical space and immersive
experiences of their users, and users can (and frequently do) visit multiple online
platforms in a single day. No one corporation holds “title” to the entire internet, and
a ban from one website does not preclude a user posting on another. Online platforms
do not fall at the extremes of the company town. And while it’s difficult for users to
move their content over to other platforms, from the perspective of users-as-listeners,
there is complete freedom of movement. Online platforms don’t have any of the
practical pain-in-the-neck switching costs (like changing a cord in the back of the
television) for users that want to go see content in another place. At most, one may
argue that they hold a position of power over the time and attention of their users
similar to the shopping mall in PruneYard. But this analogy, too, strikes us as strained
since people can only be in one physical space at a time. By contrast, a user can
access what has been said on several different social networks at several different
times with ease.
The remedies given to those affected by privately-owned towns and “public”
spaces does not apply to social media companies who handle suspensions, bans, and
appeals “in house.” For example, while Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat banned
Donald Trump’s accounts on their sites on January 6, 2021, Twitch did not ban him
until January 7, and YouTube waited until January 13.75 And while Parler’s ban from
app stores and web hosting admittedly does more closely resemble an effective
removal from the internet,76 that decision concerned a set of private actors in a wholly
different industry than the platforms (like Facebook and Twitter) that are targets of
state attempts to create must-carry rules.
Given these significant distinctions between platforms and information
curators in the physical and broadcast context, it might make sense to compare
platforms to the internet companies that actually have been placed under legal
restrictions that require common carriage: basic ISPs. We do this next.

74. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189–90 (1997).
75. Mike Isaac & Kate Conger, Facebook Bars Trump Through End of His Term, N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/technology/facebook-trump-ban.html
[https://perma.cc/HF8A-ASTP] (May 18, 2021) (discussing the bans for Facebook and
Instagram); Jay Peters, Twitch Disables Trump’s Account Indefinitely, THE VERGE (Jan. 7,
2021,
2:27
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/7/22219144/twitch-trump-banindefinitely-capitol-attack [https://perma.cc/2HU8-9NQ6]; Brian Fung, YouTube Is
BUS.,
Suspending
President
Donald
Trump’s
Channel,
CNN
https://edition.cnn.com/2021/01/12/tech/youtube-trump-suspension/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6TQW-KCZW] (Jan. 13, 2021, 17:15).
76. See, e.g., Brian Fung, Parler Has Now Been Booted by Amazon, Apple and Google,
BUS.,
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/09/tech/parler-suspended-apple-appCNN
store/index.html [https://perma.cc/T33B-AJXC] (Jan. 11, 2021, 6:54 AM) (noting that,
without access to “the internet’s two largest app stores,” the bans threatened “to cut Parler off
from its entire audience”).
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III. ANALOGIES FROM THE INTERNET AGE
So far, analogies to speech distributors, publishers, and venues in traditional
media have not provided a clear route for a government to compel a platform like
Twitter or Facebook to host all messages. Next, we consider whether an analogy to
basic ISPs could support this sort of regulatory imposition on platforms. After all,
basic internet providers like Comcast were reclassified during the Obama
administration as common carriers under Title II of the Federal Communications
Commission Act. In U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, the majority of a D.C. circuit panel
concluded that net neutrality rules can be promulgated and administered on basic
ISPs without implicating First Amendment protections.77
The distinction between basic service providers and content platforms can be
drawn and defended quite easily if it isn't pressed too hard: the elaborate community
norms that are designed and enforced by platforms like Facebook are curation
decisions that have meaningful expressive value. Facebook’s terms of service
prohibit not only certain categories of legal-but-objectionable content (such as
pornography, racist speech, and harassing language) but also require that content be
“authentic.”78 Users must use their real names in their profiles, for example.79 As a
whole, the rules and the (at least occasional) enforcement of the rules communicate
a Facebook ethos—that the messages available here, while diverse across many
measures, meet some vague standard of decency and are posted without the
protective veil of anonymity. It’s not much of a message, but it is at least as
articulable as the expressive interest of the parade organizer in Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group.80 Hurley involved a privately-run St.
Patrick’s Day parade that took place on the streets of Boston. The organizers granted
requests from nearly all groups that wanted to participate and procession in the
parade, but they denied permission to the gay and lesbian organization.81 While the
Massachusetts Supreme Court found that the parade as a whole lacked expressive
meaning, the Supreme Court disagreed: even a “big tent” parade that accepts nearly
every application still communicates a message in its selection process. “[A] private
speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious
voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive
subject matter of the speech . . . .”82
By contrast, basic internet providers really do act as mere conduits, like a parcel
service. As a descriptive matter, the ISPs that challenged the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) order seemed to want to preserve the right to
make throttling decisions without communicating any particular value or principle
to their users. These were not basic service providers that offered a family-friendly
internet experience or any other particular form of content filtering. Rather, they
aimed to preserve the opportunity to throttle service for any or no reason. The

77. 825 F.3d 674, 740–44 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
78. Facebook Community Standards, META, https://transparency.fb.com/policies/
community-standards/.
79. Id.
80. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 569–70.
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concern from the public, whether justified or not, is that some broadband service
providers might use the capability to give an advantage to their own subsidiaries and
business partners. This threat would not convey the sort of minimal message
described in Hurley. If Time Warner wanted to favor content produced by its own
subsidiaries, or if AT&T elected to provide faster broadband speeds for content
creators that paid for special treatment,83 those promotions or throttling decisions
would relate only to the firms’ profits. The only message that is sent by such content
management decisions is “I love money!”
Thus, platforms like Twitter and basic internet providers like Comcast fall on
opposite sides of an important constitutional distinction—the consideration of
whether the firm claiming a First Amendment right has what Eugene Volokh calls a
“coherent speech product.”84 The boundary precedents for this concept can be found
in the Supreme Court’s analysis of compelled speech doctrine on university campus
recruiting fairs (FAIR) on one side and in pregnancy centers (NIFLA) on the other.
In FAIR, the Supreme Court found that there are many contexts on campus,
including at recruiting fairs, in which a university does not actively engage in the
creation of a coherent speech environment or product. Unlike a classroom, where a
coherent message is crafted with the influence of institutional rules and standards,
the quad, the student union, and the campus recruiting fairs are spaces in which
students are exposed to a hodgepodge of uncontrolled messages. Thus, the Solomon
Amendment, which required campuses to allow the U.S. military to participate in
career fairs, did not violate a school’s First Amendment rights because it encroached
on a function of the school that did not cultivate and craft a selected message.
By contrast, a California statute requiring crisis pregnancy centers (which
generally counsel visitors to not seek abortions) to post a notice advising visitors that
abortion services are available elsewhere was struck down. The Court reasoned that
the compelled disclosure was in conflict with the crisis pregnancy center’s own

83. The FCC was particularly concerned that dominant content producers like Netflix or
Amazon would collocate servers with certain broadband providers so that packets could be
delivered to users without having to interconnect with the “backbone” of the internet. Fears
that broadband service providers would start favoring content based on side deals or subsidiary
ownership was still speculative and theoretical at the time the D.C. Circuit made its decision
in the open internet order. See Ken Engelhart, Opinion, Why Concerns About Net Neutrality
Are Overblown, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/opinion/
net-neutrality-overblown-concerns.html [https://perma.cc/Q7QF-4FW4].
84. Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355, 361–66 (2018).
The hardest cases to categorize along these lines are Hurley (parades) and National Institute
of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (crisis pregnancy centers), which were both found to
have a coherent speech product, and Turner Broadcasting (cable channel selection) and
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. (military recruiting at law
schools), which were both found to not have a coherent message. Given that reasonable minds
could differ on how to interpret the expressiveness of each of these entities attempting to
restrict access, we could expect reasonable disagreement as to the interpretation of a platform
like Facebook, too. As we said above, on balance, we think the pluralist-but-still-somewhatdiscriminating parade in Hurley is the best analogy. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557; Nat’l Inst.
of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc. (FAIR), 547
U.S. 47 (2006).
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speech, and therefore had the effect of muddling the message and meaning of the
center.
To our minds, these precedents help clarify why Facebook and Twitter retain First
Amendment rights to be free from government compulsion to host or promote
content even if Comcast can be compelled to treat all web packets equally (for the
most part). A basic ISP that wants to compete with others as a clean or decent
alternative, and that refuses carriage of traffic to and from websites that it has deemed
indecent, would transcend the criteria that were considered by the D.C. Circuit Court
when it concluded that basic ISPs could be regulated as common carriers. Indeed,
the court explained:
If a broadband provider . . . were to choose to exercise editorial
discretion—for instance, by picking a limited set of websites to carry and
offering that service as a curated internet experience—it might then
qualify as a First Amendment speaker. But the Order itself excludes such
providers from the rules. The Order defines broadband internet access
services as a “mass-market retail service”—i.e., a service that is
“marketed and sold on a standardized basis”—that “provides the
capability to transmit data to and receive data from all or substantially all
Internet endpoints.”85
The court is implying that a broadband service provider that decided to offer a
filtered experience to end users would be treated as a First Amendment speaker.
Since users of platform services like Facebook or Twitter (and especially for highly
specialized platforms like Petzbe)86 choose those services in part because of the way
they restrict and curate information, they presumably qualify (or at least might
qualify) as a First Amendment speaker under the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning.
However, there is one way in which platforms would be better equipped than
broadband ISPs to tolerate a must-carry rule: platforms could disavow a message that
it is required to carry. That is, even if Twitter had to carry all (legal) content posted
by its members, it could make clear that the content is visible by direction of the
applicable law rather than at Twitter’s discretion.

85. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 743 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re
Protecting & Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5745–46 ¶ 336 & n.879
(2015)).
86. This is a social media app where all profiles must be pets. See About Petzbe, PETZBE,
https://petzbe.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/LYU7-T4XU].
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A platform could place a warning on any content that violates its own community
norms, and they could presumably even give users the opportunity to opt into a
newsfeed filter that blocks content containing the warning—a power that would
presumably be fully protected under First Amendment listener rights. Sure enough,
misattribution or source confusion is a theme in the analyses of many compelled
speech cases. When there is little risk that viewers would associate a message with
the entity claiming First Amendment protection, courts are more likely to find that a
regulation avoids interfering with the entity’s right to free expression.87
That said, if the platform has an expressive interest in restricting content across
its site so that it adheres to certain subjects or interests, or so that it adheres to
minimum levels of decency, then a must-carry order would directly interfere with
that message (just as the disclosure in NIFLA interfered with the messages of crisis
pregnancy centers) regardless of whether the platform could signal disagreement and
disavowal of the content. Having the content at all would “alter the content of
[petitioners’] speech.”88 For these reasons, the holding and reasoning of Hurley
seems the most appropriate to us. The contents of any one individual’s Twitter feed
are going to be a multifaceted, borderline incoherent parade, but it’s still an
expressive collaboration between the user and the particular social media platform.
Next, we consider whether the expressive rights of a social media platform should
be curtailed in light of the practical importance that the forum has to many users who
want an audience on them.

87. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 654; FAIR, 547 U.S. at 65.
88. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc.,
487 U.S. 781, 795).
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IV. PRIVATE PUBLIC SQUARES
Another argument that might suggest common carriage requirements are
consistent with the First Amendment stems from the common assertion, endorsed by
the Supreme Court, that the largest social media companies are essential access
points for public discourse. In Packingham v. North Carolina, for example, the Court
identified social media as “the most important place[] . . . for the exchange of
views.”89 Although Packingham struck down a government-imposed deplatforming
of a criminal defendant, the sentiment that the largest social media companies exert
control over the information ecosystem without a sufficient check from other
companies is widely shared. That thinking, consistent with antitrust scrutiny of large
tech firms, could plausibly support an argument that a monopoly held by any one
tech firm on critical infrastructure for public discourse should rightfully be regulated
to expand access to as many speakers and ideas as possible.90
Internet platforms are not exploiting their market power to make discretionary
content decisions over a captive audience. To the contrary, they are locked in
competition with other online platforms. When they use their control to moderate
user content, they do so not for anticompetitive purposes (as in Associated Press)
and not even for idiosyncratic purposes, but rather in order to satisfy their users’
interests as proverbial listeners. Each firm is part of a nearly limitless internet, where
new, competing services are created daily, unconstrained by the bandwidth and
licensing limitations of broadcast media (as in Red Lion) or the physical
technological limitations of cable media (as in Turner II). Thus, the rules that have
occasionally justified a deviation from First Amendment protections of editorial
discretion do not apply to online platforms, at least not on the basis of any of their
justifications. Arguments to the contrary do not understand the true nature of the
power and motivations of social media companies.
It’s true that social media plays an increasingly important role in the information
ecosystem. Social media has recently undergone explosive growth.91 In the first
quarter of 2005, the Pew Research Center estimated that 5% of U.S. adults used
social media, while in the second quarter of 2010, they estimated that 48% of the
same group used social media, representing an annual growth rate of 189%.92 But
within the realm of social media, there is great competition, notwithstanding the fact
that a small number of firms are “winning” at the moment. When a market is
growing, everyone wants a slice of the pie, and conditions were ripe between 2005
and 2010 for many new market entrants and a great deal of investment to strengthen
those entrants’ position in the market.
The extent to which competition between content providers and platforms drives
curation decisions is debatable. It’s difficult to study, as platforms’ executives don’t

89. 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
90. See Eugene Volokh, Treating Social Media Platforms Like Common Carriers?, 1 J.
FREE SPEECH L. 377 (2021).
91. See Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/
[https://perma.cc/6VUKYBCJ].
92. Id.
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always make public pronouncements and when they do, they aren’t always true.93
But there are some hints that users are driving curation decisions as opposed to
passively accepting them. For instance, in late October 2019, when Jack Dorsey said
Twitter was banning political ads because of concerns that “democratic
infrastructure” couldn’t handle it, media commentators noted that the announcement
came “minutes before Facebook posted its quarterly results,” a clue that the decision
might have been made for the purpose of differentiating Twitter from Facebook.94
Recent Pew data shows that between the first quarter of 2019 and the first quarter of
2021, the share of U.S. adults that used social media was completely flat at 72%.95
Dorsey and his team made a bold move to ban political ads after about three quarters
of completely flat growth in Twitter’s total addressable market. Between 2019 and
2021, the percentage of U.S. adults who said they use Twitter has increased a tick
from 22% to 23%.96 Publicly traded U.S. companies are under tremendous pressure
to grow quarter over quarter.97 For a company like Twitter, there are two options for
growth: more customers or more revenue per customer. In a scenario where both the
total market and the company’s userbase is essentially flat, the only option is more
revenue per customer, and one of the ways to achieve that is to increase the average
amount of engagement per customer. (The other is hypertargeted advertising—a
practice that gets platforms in trouble out of concern for user privacy.)
Economics research on social media suggests that “when sites pursue
differentiated feature designs, the likelihood of winner-take-all outcome is
reduced.”98 This is so because “product differentiation typically makes it easier for
the firms to co-exist.”99 Accordingly, although the motivation of Twitter is not
explicit, it can be inferred that they are in a tough spot vis-à-vis growth. They are
making decisions about their product and the speech they allow in their offering
based on two factors: increasing engagement per user in a time of almost negligible
user growth and differentiating their product in order to prevent losing the winnertake-all battle to Facebook.100 That begs the question whether changes to the

93. Ben Thompson, Facebook and the Feed, STRATECHERY (Apr. 22, 2015),
https://stratechery.com/2015/facebook-and-the-feed/
(comparing
Facebook’s
stated
motivation for its 2015 newsfeed algorithm change and the business incentives for it).
94. Georgia Wells & Emily Glazer, Twitter to Ban Political Ads, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/twitter-to-no-longer-accept-political-ads-11572466313
[https://perma.cc/LXG2-Z2XB] (Oct. 30, 2019, 8:11 PM).
95. PEW RSCH. CTR., supra note 91.
96. Id.
97. For example, Standard & Poore’s technology sector index has grown on average 22%
each year over the last five years. S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P NORTH AMERICAN
TECHNOLOGY SECTOR INDEX, https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/equity/sp-northamerican-technology-sector-index/#overview.
98. KAIFU ZHANG & MIKLOS SARVARY, SOCIAL MEDIA COMPETITION: DIFFERENTIATION
WITH USER-GENERATED CONTENT 24–25 (2012), https://www.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/
IMG/pdf/PSE-comm-and-beliefs-june2012-Sarvary-Zhang.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZW7WZRYJ].
99. Id. at 25.
100. It is worth noting that over the same period, 2019–21, Pew shows Facebook’s user
growth is even flatter than Twitter’s, but Facebook has a commanding lead in the race for U.S.
users. This suggests that Facebook’s speech moderation is aimed at increasing engagement
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acceptable content policies on Twitter seem like they are intended to differentiate
from other online platforms. It certainly seemed so in January 2021 when
TechCrunch noted that “[u]sers are surging on small, conservative, social media
platforms after President Donald Trump’s ban from the world’s largest social
networks.”101 Even before the catalytic events related to Donald Trump’s suspension
in early January of 2021, though, Facebook and Twitter were well aware that their
content moderation decisions were becoming part of their brand identity. The firms
were fumbling for their place and reputation within the spectrum between “nanny
state” and “grossly inadequate” moderation policies.102
Each online platform tries, via design choices and/or machine learning algorithms,
to develop a service which is more enticing to the kind of user they want to attract.
These choices naturally make their service less attractive to users with different
preferences. Users who don’t like a certain strategy may, over time, migrate away
from online platforms with differentiation strategies that they dislike in favor of
online platforms with strategies that they find appealing. This might be a good
strategy for every online platform other than Facebook to preserve a niche audience,
but we believe there are dangers to social cohesiveness lurking within this outcome.
To be clear, we are troubled by the proliferation of “filter bubbles” that Eli Pariser
described ten years ago. That is, it is not good for the psychological health, the social
cohesion, or the epistemic future of our country that individuals can effortlessly wind
up in an internet echo chamber where their preconceived preferences and beliefs are
reinforced. It is tempting to directly regulate dominant platforms to try to pop the
filter bubbles.103 But if the bubbles are the result of users’ authentic and agentic
choices about which type of curated environment they actually want to be in, a “mustcarry” style of rule will flout the preferences of users as listeners. It will also diminish
opportunities for non-Facebook platforms to compete for users based on different,
perhaps more virtuous methods of information curation. It is therefore not at all clear
that a “must-carry” rule is more respectful of free speech from the listener’s
perspective than the private censorial decisions of platforms that are better matched
to the listener’s choices.
While it’s tempting to want to ensure that the most popular platforms are available
for all who wish to speak, that instinct on balance runs against the First Amendment

more than it is at avoiding the winner-take-all effect. Brooke Auxier & Monica Anderson,
Social Media Use in 2021, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/
internet/2021/04/07/social-media-use-in-2021/.
101. Jonathan Shieber, Parler Jumps to No. 1 on App Store After Facebook and Twitter
Ban Trump, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 9, 2021, 1:45 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/09/parlerjumps-to-no-1-on-app-store-after-facebook-and-twitter-bans/ [https://perma.cc/8KFT-2UF5].
102. PAUL M. BARRETT, WHO MODERATES THE SOCIAL MEDIA GIANTS? A CALL TO END
OUTSOURCING 2 (2020) (“grossly inadequate”). See Kate Conger, Facebook, Google and
Twitter C.E.O.s Return to Washington to Defend Their Content Moderation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/28/technology/facebook-google-and-twitterceos-return-to-washington-to-defend-their-content-moderation.html [https://perma.cc/R489X58M] (“Republicans argue the companies—Twitter, in particular—are being heavy-handed
in their content moderation and are unfairly silencing conservative voices.”).
103. See generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM
YOU (2011).
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interests not only of platforms but of (most) users as well. Too much of the debate
on platforms and common carriage treats users of platform services as passive
consumers, who accept with few outside options the terms by which Facebook,
Twitter, and other platforms perform their content moderation. But if we take
seriously the undisturbed assumptions that undergird Reno v. ACLU—a case in
which the Supreme Court recognized that the internet is a fundamentally different
medium because it can make all content accessible at once, and at low cost—then
platforms large and small can be understood as competing on the quality of their
content recommendations and moderation decisions. When users can join a nearly
limitless number of social networking services, their choice to stay with Facebook or
to migrate to Parler, to use a vivid example, will depend to some extent on how well
the platform provided the right sort of filtered experience for each particular user.
Each platform is attempting to provide the ultimate “coherent speech product” by
promoting what is most interesting, demoting what is less interesting, and by
signaling a community stand against certain content either because it’s off topic or
downright repugnant.
Thus, social media platforms have no neat First Amendment analogies. They
dominate attention like television, radio, and newspapers once did, but they dominate
by matching the interests of their users. The dominance is precariously reliant on
serving listeners’ interests. In the next Part, we explore what sorts of policies make
sense given the peculiar features of platforms.
V. ONLINE PLATFORMS ARE THEIR OWN FREE SPEECH BEAST
The justifications that were used to regulate historical information curators can’t
be stretched far enough to cover the restrictions that some policymakers and legal
scholars have proposed for internet platforms. To be sure, the First Amendment
precedent leaves some ambiguity in the contours of protection and uncertainty in its
application to online platforms. But the trouble with regulating online platforms is
evident from the incoherence and weakness of the existing proposals. A Florida law
forbids what it calls “post-prioritization” and “shadow banning” of several categories
of content (except advertising, hilariously) which, given the broad definitions of both
terms, effectively bars Facebook from running a newsfeed.104 Proposals by Senator
Josh Hawley and by prominent legal scholars Erwin Chemerinsky and Prasad
Krishnamurthy avoid eliminating or radically altering recommendation algorithms
like the Facebook newsfeed and allow for content removal based on the platform’s
established standards, but they forbid content removal based on political
viewpoint.105 But as the history of President Trump’s tweets vividly demonstrate,
there is no neat separation between community standards and political signaling. The
fact that commenters across the political spectrum cannot even articulate a workable
rule (regardless of its constitutionality) that can address real threats of political bias

104. S.B. 7072, 2021 Leg., 123d Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021).
105. Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act, S. 1914, 116th Cong. (2019); Prasad
Krishnamurthy & Erwin Chemerinsky, How Congress Can Prevent Big Tech from Becoming
the Speech Police, THE HILL (Feb 18, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/
539341-how-congress-can-prevent-big-tech-from-becoming-the-speech-police
[https://perma.cc/Y4H5-EJCD].
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without disturbing the platform’s power to purge terrible content shows that online
platforms, as a medium, are not good candidates for common carriage.
What, then, should online platforms be encouraged to do in order to preserve the
user experience that people want to have without alienating users by purging too
much, or too little, content?
One solution is to increase transparency. In a world where online platforms
disclosed to the public why they make the content judgments that they make, online
platforms could build confidence that their moderation decisions are conducted in a
manner that is free from at least deliberate bias. If online platforms were transparent
and consistent in their analysis of content and in their decision-making process
concerning what speech to endorse, what speech to tag with editorial disclaimers,
and what speech to ban, it would give both legislators and consumers the means to
check whether the online platforms are generally motivated to deliver the experience
that their users want and are not pursuing a political agenda.106
Another option is to lean into user controls as a way to fine-tune the listener
experience. Many platforms already allow users to provide input about what types of
messages they do or do not want to see (in addition, of course, to the constant
feedback loop every recommendation algorithm creates based on the user’s actual
clicking behavior). Facebook allows users to hide posts or friends. These actions
allow the newsfeed to learn what sort of content to not serve for each user, but the
user interface could be enhanced to encourage users to set their own standards by
more actively moderating their own feeds.
CONCLUSION
Regulating curators of information is not a new idea; this paper has traced a
hundred years of the phenomenon. The kinds of regulation explored here are
appropriate within the confines of historical regulation, but online platforms are
fundamentally dissimilar and thus the justifications that made sense in the past do
not make sense today.
In the twenty-first century, communications platforms on the internet might be as
crucial to an educated populace—or, at least, an engaged and informed populace—
as the U.S. Postal Service was in the 1920s. But the critical differences between a
unitary, publicly funded government service intended as the glue to bind an immense
new country and the plethora of privately-owned online platforms are twofold and
convincing: consumers have a wide array of online platforms from which to choose
and the owners of those platforms have the right to create the user experience that
they feel is appropriate to attract the kinds of customers they think will form a
successful business.107

106. But see Eric Goldman, The Constitutionality of Mandating Editorial Transparency,
73 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2022), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=4005647 [https://perma.cc/Y3D4-LVUE].
107. The question of how to interpret Justice Holmes’s dissent in Burleson as it applies to
online platforms is complicated. Should it be read as elevating the First Amendment rights of
would-be users of online above the private property interests of the owners of those platforms,
much like the rights of the newspaper publishers who wanted to use the mail challenged the
rights of the government to regulate the U.S. Postal Service? Or should it be considered as a
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The Associated Press was using its power in an anticompetitive way, but online
platforms wield their power with exactly the opposite motivation to compete with
one another in a dynamic market that requires differentiation to avoid market
consolidation by a single platform. Analogizing users of online platforms who do not
like the consequences of their viewpoints or the repercussions of their speech in the
context of the chosen strategy of the platform where they speak to competitors of the
Associated Press who were the victims of unfair competition is to draw a similarity
where there is none.
The limitations of bandwidth and technology that dissenting voices and
disadvantaged speakers leveraged to convince courts to carve out protection for their
messages across the broadcast spectrum and on cable networks don’t exist on the
internet. The nature of the internet as a nearly infinite fertile ground for new
businesses and new ideas means that these arguments fall far short of convincing
when it comes to hollowing out private property rights when speakers with
viewpoints contrary to the philosophy of the companies they wish would amplify
their speech.
Finally, the application of logic that justifies forcing the “company town” open to
potentially objectionable speech is misguided. Facebook is a good tool for
communication and commerce, but we don’t have to live there. And there is no
exclusivity to our attention the way there is in a physical space like a shopping mall:
we don’t lose access to other online content even when we are logged into Facebook.
The most productive reforms that the federal government could encourage and
possibly impose on social media companies are transparency tools. This includes
more open communication about the criteria that leads to certain posts being banned,
deprioritized, flagged, or endorsed; lifting the veil to educate users on why they are
seeing some polarizing content; feedback loops that allow users to more actively
participate in the moderation of the content that they view; and site features to allow
users to gauge whether they are viewing a distorted subset of content.

limitation on the power of the government to dictate how online platforms are allowed to act
justified by an appeal to foundational American principles–now, private property rights, then,
free speech? The distinction between a government agency and a private company seems to
suggest the latter.
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